An Economic Analysis of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Auctions as an Efficient Alternative to Judicial Intervention by Gray, Charles H.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 44 | Issue 2 Article 7
An Economic Analysis of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act: Auctions as an Efficient
Alternative to Judicial Intervention
Charles H. Gray
Copyright c 2002 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Charles H. Gray, An Economic Analysis of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Auctions as an
Efficient Alternative to Judicial Intervention, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 829 (2002),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol44/iss2/7
NOTES
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT: AUCTIONS AS AN EFFICIENT
ALTERNATIVE TO JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
INTRODUCTION
In 2001, the Third Circuit affirmed a district court's approval of
a $3.2 billion settlement in a securities class action case brought
principally against Cendant Corporation.1 The district court
selected lead counsel in this "mega case" through an auction 2-a
new, innovative tool for class action litigation.' Although the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit ultimately held that the lower court
erred in conducting an auction to determine who would represent
the class,' use of court ordered auctions in securities litigation is on
the rise. The law firms who represented the class in this case
received a court-approved $262 million in fees and an additional
$14.6 million in expenses." With the realistic possibility of billions
1. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 217 (3d Cir. 2001).
2. Id. at 218.
3. See Kathryn Kranhold & Richard B. Schmitt, To Rein In Fees, Some Judges Ask
Attorneys to Bid, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2000, at B1.
4. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 286.
5. Id.; see also Max W. Berger et al., Cendant- The Dawning of a New Age, in FINANCIAL
FRAUD IN PUBLIC COMPANIES: PREVENTION, DETECTION & LITIGATION 227,235-36 (PLI Corp.
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1203, 2000); Barren J. Robbins & Fred B.
Burnside, The Race to the Bottom: Bidding For Lead Counsel and its Impact on Securities
Class Actions, in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP 2001, at 311,313-76 (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1262, 2001) (analyzing the theory of competitive
bidding for lead counsel in class action law suits).
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of dollars at stake, it is imperative that individual investors,
institutional investors, and law firms that anticipate representing
potential classes know and understand the implications of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)6 and, specifically,
the role court-ordered auctions could play in securities litigation.
The PSLRA was designed to combat perceived failures in class
action securities litigation. The legislative history behind the
PSLRA, passed in 1995, reveals that Congress intended to reduce
"abuse in private securities lawsuits," especially "the manipulation
by class action lawyers of the clients whom they purportedly
represent."7 Through the PSLRA, Congress tried to correct the
typical scenario of lawyers seeking clients instead of clients seeking
lawyers.8 To further this goal, the PSLRA provides increased access
to the litigation system to more savvy and involved potential
plaintiffs.9 Lead plaintiffs under the PSLRA are now chosen not
based on the timeliness of their filing, but upon the stake that they
have in the litigation.'" These plaintiffs, given an increased ability
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000).
7. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995).
8. A typical "race to the courthouse" often began with a professional plaintiff who held
shares of numerous publicly traded companies. When a cause of action arose, this
professional plaintiff would "race to the courthouse" and attempt to be the first to file suit.
See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and
Lawyers, 51 BuS. LAw. 1009, 1011 (1996). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding
the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677-79, 681-84 (1986)
(discussing the "bounty hunter" behavior of attorneys in class actions).
9. In particular, the PSLRA provides that the investor (or group of investors) with the
largest stake in a securities class action has the option of representing the class, thus
increasing the role of larger investors in the litigation process. Large institutional investors
are presumed to be experienced consumers of legal representation and to have more
resources available to dedicate to the litigation process. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 8,
at 1040-41.
10. The PSLRA establishes a standard that the movant in an action must have "the
largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class .... 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(a)(3XBXiii)(I)(bb). But cf Roger W. Kirby & Ira M. Press, Analysis of Decisions Relating to
Disputed Lead Plaintiff Appointments Under the PSLRA, in 2 INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 2000, at 617, 627-28 (32d ed., PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 1213, 2000) (commenting on the vagueness of the PSLRA's standard for
establishing who has the "largest financial interest").
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to control their own fate, began to participate with greater fre-
quency in the class action process."
Congress wished to provide the whole class, instead of a select
few, with the best, most efficient litigation tools and measures. In
every class action litigation, the plaintiff class is comprised of the
lead plaintiff, who has the single largest stake in the litigation, and
other nonparticipatory parties. To ensure that the rights of
nonactive parties are represented, Congress has provided some
limitations on the power vested in lead plaintiffs. The PSLRA
provides that, upon the appointment of the lead plaintiff, she "shall,
subject to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to
represent the class[, thereby explicitly involving the court in the
process of deciding who will represent the class. A qualified lead
plaintiffs power to select counsel for the class is thus far from
absolute.
Early interpretations of the PSLRA gave a broad range of
freedom to lead plaintiffs in selecting and retaining counsel. 13 The
only perceived limitation was that the counsel chosen withstand
judicial approval. Still, the fact that courts maintain authority to
approve or reject a lead plaintiffs selection indicates that the power
of the lead plaintiff to choose legal counsel for the class is not
absolute. Instead, lead counsel must be qualified to best represent
the class in the eyes of the court.
The PSLRA still has wrinkles. The potential for corruption in
choosing and retaining counsel still exists. Infirmities such as
11. Craig C. Martin & Martin H. Metcalf, The Fiduciary Duties of Institutional Investors
in Securities Litigation, 56 BuS. LAW. 1381, 1383 (2001) (noting that "[t]he PSLRA
encourages institutional investors and pension funds to participate in securities [litigation]
... through provisions that provide them with enhanced opportunities to undertake the role
of class representative"); see also Martin & Metcalf, supra, at 1389-1404 (noting that courts
have looked favorably upon the increased role for institutional investors under the PSLRA);
Cendant, 264 F.3d at 222 (approving decision of district court to appoint CalPERS as lead
plaintiff); Switzenbaum v. Orbital Sci. Corp., 187 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Va. 1999) (appointing five
city pension funds as lead plaintiffs); Blaich v. Employee Solutions, Inc., [Supp. 1998
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,109, at 90,145 (D. Ariz. Nov. 21, 1997)
(debating the adequacy of a city pension fund to represent the class as lead plaintiff).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(BXv) (emphasis added).
13. See SEC, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF
PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, at 15-16 (1997)
(describing the lead plaintiffs selection of lead counsel as presumptively valid), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies.shtml (last visited Nov. 20, 2002).
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overbilling, inadequate representation of the class, and improper
focus on the needs of the lead plaintiff are problems still remaining,
even after enactment and enforcement of the PSLRA. These
problems arise, not because of the inherent nature of the PSLRA,
but because the language of the Act allows self-interested lead
plaintiffs to ignore the interests of the rest of the class.
A competitive bidding system for the determination of lead
counsel is the most effective way to close the gaps left open by the
PSLRA. Auctions effect an administrative allocation of sources as
an alternative to deficient market forces.1' This Note argues that
the best, and most efficient, way to combat races to court and to
protect nonparticipating plaintiffs is to open the lead counsel role
to a competitive bidding process."
How far does a court's power stretch when dealing with the issue
of who represents the class? Under the terms of the PSLRA, courts
maintain veto power over the selection of lead counsel.' 6 This Note
will show that a competitive bidding process is an efficient market
clearing mechanism for the selection and retention of lead counsel,
and that such a process is encompassed under the powers granted
to the court by the PSLRA."7 Court-ordered auctions are not only
permissible, they should be used with greater frequency. 8
This Note will (1) provide a brief discussion of the history of the
PSLRA; (2) determine Congress' intent in passing the Act,
emphasizing its consideration of the possibility of "competitive
bidding;" (3) examine the economic rationale of a competitive
bidding process and discuss the role it can have in securities
14. Curt A. Monash, Efficient Allocation of a Stochastic Supply: Auction Mechanisms, in
AUCTIONS, BIDDING, AND CONTRACTING: USES AND THEORY 231, 231 (Richard Engelbrecht-
Wiggans et al. eds., 1983).
15. Competitive bidding and auction theory are discussed in depth throughout this Note.
Unless otherwise stated, this Note uses the terms "auction" or "competitive bid" to describe
the basic closed envelope, final bid system. Thus, a firm who participates in the auction
process, after researching the "value" of the litigation, submits the price it would charge for
representing the class if it was selected to serve as class counsel. No collusion among, or even
knowledge of, other bidders should be permitted. If accepted by the court as adequate and
realistic, all bids are final.
16. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995).
17. See infra Parts I, Ill.
18. For an opposingview, see Kendra S. Langlois, Note,Putting the Plaintiff Class'Needs
in the Lead: Reforming Class Action Litigation by Expanding the Lead Plaintiff Provision of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 855 (2002).
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litigation; (4) analyze courts' experimentation with the auction
process and evaluate whether auctions, in their present form, are
an adequate answer to the concerns reflected in the PSLRA; (5)
discuss the effect that auctions have had on prospective lead
plaintiffs and prospective lead counsel; and finally, (6) suggest what
should be done to correct the inconsistent interpretations regarding
auctions and the PSLRA.
I. HISTORY OF THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM ACT
With the enactment of the PSLRA, Congress addressed two
distinct interests: preventing securities fraud and ensuring that the
"litigation process is not used for abusive purposes." 9 Still another
purpose of the PSLRA is to protect and inform all members of the
class.20 Before enacting the PSLRA, lawyers who represented "lead
plaintiffs"21 would strive to be the first to file a claim, obviously
dreaming of large rewards that could accrue as a result of litigation.
This "race to the courthouse" had numerous adverse affects on the
litigation process. For example, in an effort to expedite the filing
process, firms representing potential lead plaintiffs often neglected
to conduct an adequate investigation of the facts or likelihood of
success. 22 Congress, therefore, had a strong desire to reform
attorney-driven litigation.
To combat this problem, the PSLRA first mandated that, absent
evidence to the contrary, the individual, institutional investor, or
19. Phillips & Miller, supra note 8, at 1009. Phillips and Miller also suggest that
Congress wished to correct the "professional plaintiff problem that leads to the proverbial
"race to the courthouse." Id. at 1011.
20. See Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577, 583 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78(j) 21(aX3XA) (2000). The notice requirement is necessary to "present a fair recital
of the subject matter of the suit and to inform all class members of their opportunity to be
heard.' In re Gypsum Antitrust Cases, 565 F.2d 1123,1125 (9th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added).
21. Many attorneys specialized in being lead plaintiffs, often holding a broad array of
public stock. A rather humorous example of the problem Congress intended to remedy was
given by a class action attorney who noted, "I have the greatest practice ... in the world ....
I have no clients.' William P. Barret, I Have No Clients, FORBES, Oct. 11, 1993, at 52.
22. See Phillips& Miller, supra note 8, at 1011 ("Complaints frequently were filed within
days or even hours of a stock price drop precipitated by an unexpected earnings decline or
other negative news about the company's operations.').
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even group of investors with the largest stake in the action
should represent the class.23 The result of this provision of the Act
is that large, institutional investors often have an increased role
in the litigation process.24 This appears, on its face, to have a
favorable effect on class action lawsuits. The theory behind
involving large investors, especially pension funds, mutual funds,
or large corporate entities, is that they are presumed to be shrewd
investors and sophisticated consumers of legal advice.
The second measure Congress established in the PSLRA was one
allowing the lead plaintiff, "subject to the approval of the court, [to]
select and retain counsel to represent the class."' Following the
appointment of a lead plaintiff, the chosen counsel must withstand
the protective scrutiny of the court. Courts, understandably, have
shown much deference to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel.26 For
example, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Texas took only cursory note of the lead plaintiffs choice of
retained counsel.27 The theory underlying such "blind" approvals of
lead counsel is that the lead plaintiff, typically a sophisticated and
knowledgeable investor who holds a large claim in the action, will
be able to adequately choose and retain counsel that will best
23. See 15 US.C. § 77z-1(a)(3XBXiii)(I)(bb) (establishing a rebuttable presumption of
adequacy for the potential lead plaintiff who "in the determination of the court has the
largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class"). For examples of appointing
groups as lead, see Stuart M. Grant, Appointment of Lead Plaintiff Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 547, 560 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1070, 1998) (citing In re Informix Corp. Sec. Litig., No.
C-97-1289-SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23687 *1, *7-11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 1997) (appointing
the group with the largest loss as lead plaintiff because there was no institutional investor);
Malin v. Ivax Corp., No. 96-1843, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22452 *1, *10-11 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31,
1996) (denying an individual with a $44,100 loss the co-lead plaintiff position in favor of a
group of investors with losses of $1.5 million).
24. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J.
2053, 2055-56 (1995) (proposing that "institutions acting individually or collectively, might
be well situated to monitor the conduct of plaintiffs attorneys as proxies for all members of
the plaintiff class" thus reducing agency costs inherent in class action litigation).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (aX3)(BXv).
26. See, e.g., Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542,550 (N.D. Tex. 1997) ("Giving the
lead plaintiff primary control for the selection of counsel was a critical part of Congress' effort
to transfer control of securities class actions from lawyers to investors."); see also In re Oxford
Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (reviewing and granting the
plaintiffs' choice of counsel without more than a cursory glance at each firm's resume).
27. See Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 550.
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represent the class' interests.' These courts assume that the
interests of the largest investor will coincide with the interests of
the whole class; however, this argument does damage to the intent
of the Act. Congress recognized that the interests of the class and
the interests of the lead plaintiff may not always coincide. This is
the reason Congress granted to the courts the power to approve or
disapprove of the lead plaintiff's selection.' The objective of
protecting the minority of the class' interest in the litigation is the
underlying purpose of the PSLRA.
The possibility that the selected lead counsel will not act in the
best interests of the class, but instead act for the sole interests of
the lead plaintiff who selected the counsel, is ever present in
securities litigation.'0 Conflicts of interest are likely to arise among
lead counsel's various duties. These conflicts could result in a
possible breach of fiduciary duty owed by lead counsel to the rest
of the class because counsel could understandably favor its
relationship with lead plaintiff. As large investors often use the
same law firm for different matters, the duties a firm owes to the
absent members of the class may become blurred with prior or
continuing fiduciary duties owed to the lead plaintiff."1 The Cendant
court maintained that the "ultimate inquiry is always whether the
lead plaintiffs choices were the result of a good faith selection
and negotiation process and were arrived at via meaningful arm's-
28. A potential fiduciary duty problem arises, however, if lead counsel neglects the
interests of the class in favor of the powerful lead plaintiff who chose it.
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (aX3)(BXv).
30. It is also likely that class counsel may, "if self-interest gets the best of them ... inflate
their hours, overstate the risks of litigation, or otherwise exaggerate the compensation they
deserve." Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1753,
1827-28 (2000) [hereinafter The Paths of Civil Litigation]. Additionally, if the costs and
benefits of pursuing litigation for the class are not in line with the incentives for the law
firm, a premature settlement may arise.
31. It is natural for lead plaintiffs to select counsel with whom they have worked
previously. The rules of ethics and the presumption that attorneys will act ethically at all
times, notwithstanding the potential for conflict, increases when dealing in these types of
situations. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7-1.13 (2002); see also H.R. REP. NO.
104-1058, at 11 (1995) (noting that another purpose of the PSLRA is to prevent conflicts of
interest between an attorney representing the class who may "own or otherwise [have] a
beneficial interest in the securities that are the subject of the litigation").
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length bargaining." 2 At all times, the court holds the option to
disapprove, with cause, any selected counsel.33 The court, for
example, could disqualify the selection of lead counsel and require
that the lead plaintiff select a new counsel or, alternatively, require
that the current firm revise its fee structure and resubmit it to the
court. 4 In theory, the process of a lead plaintiff selecting counsel
and the court rejecting her choice could go on forever, dramatically
increasing legal costs and unnecessarily prolonging the litigation
process. By opening the counsel selection process to competitive
bidding, litigation could proceed without unnecessary debate about
the character or loyalties of chosen counsel."5 Thus, conducting an
auction could function to improve judicial efficiency while main-
taining litigation costs at a reasonable level.
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT: ARE AUCTIONS AN APPROPRIATE
METHOD?
A. Congress'Intent
By way of the PSLRA, as shown in Part I, Congress attempted
to address abuses in the litigation process by counsel who represent
32. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing the PSLRA's
mandate that if the selected counsel is not up to par, it is the duty of the court to disapprove
the lead plaintiffs selection and require the more adequate and acceptable counsel); see also
In re Nice Sys. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206, 223 (D.N.J. 1999) (requiring that "the proposed
counsel fees should be the result of hard-bargaining land] the initial selection of counsel
should be the result of independent decision-making by the lead plaintiff"). Most courts afford
a "strong presumption" that the law firms selected by the lead plaintiffin securities litigation
are both adequate and reasonable. See, e.g., Cendant, 264 F.3d at 201.
33. Id. (I[lit is the court's obligation to disapprove the lead plaintiffs choice" when that
"ultimate inquiry" has not been satisfactory.); see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (aX3XBXv) (2000); see
also H.R. REP. No. 104-1058, at 11 (explaining that the court has the authority to disqualify
an attorney from representing the class if it is shown that there is sufficient conflict of
interest).
34. See, e.g., Cendant, 264 F.3d at 225 (affurming the district court decision allowing
selected lead counsel to revise its bid to match that of the lowest bidder).
35. Preserving judicial resources would be just one of the positive benefits of an auction
system. Once guidelines are clearly demarcated, the award of a contract to the "highest
bidder" is a very easy decision to make. No inquiry into the character of the firm, association
with the lead plaintiff, or other various conflicts of interest would be necessary.
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class action plaintiffs.3" Congress intended to prevent abusive
practices that foment litigation."1 Is judicial supervision necessary
to protect the interests of the class? Congress obviously felt that
lead counsel chosen by lead plaintiffs, if left unchecked, had the
potential to abuse the system. 8 What other reason would there
have been for Congress to give courts the power to veto lead
counsel? 9 It is therefore apparent that the dominant rationale of
this decision by Congress was to ensure that the interests of the
class remained protected throughout the litigation process.
The use of auctions to select lead counsel has been described as
a "bold innovation" that has the ability to eliminate the problems
inherent in lead counsel selection by "supplementing or supplanting
conventional judicial regulation of class action attorneys' fees with
market mechanisms."' A leading proponent of competitive bidding
for lead counsel is Judge Vaughn R. Walker of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California. In In re
Oracle,"' Judge Walker attempted to establish a trading mechanism
that would imitate a competitive market.42 Though the PSLRA does
not explicitly allow courts to introduce auctions for the selection of
lead counsel, Judge Walker maintained that the authority for a
36. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995). The possibility of abuse is greater in
large class action lawsuits because the plaintiffs accrue more costs in monitoring excessive
counsel behavior than in ordinary attorney-cient relationships. See generally Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. ClI. L. REV. 1 (1991)
(discussing the barriers to effective monitoring).
37. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6-7 (1995) (providing measures to (a) eliminate bonus
payments to named plaintiffs in class actions; (b) restrict professional plaintiffs; (c) set
restrictions for fee awards and expenses; (d) prevent abusive conflicts of interest; and (e)
encourage finality in settlement discharges).
38. In order to prevent conflicts, the House Conference Report noted that "if a plaintiff
class is represented by an attorney who directly owns or otherwise has a beneficial interest
in the securities that are the subject of the litigation," the court will have the power and
authority to "make a determination of whether such interest constitutes a conflict of interest
sufficient to disqualify the attorney from representing the class." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-
369, at 11 (1995).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (aX3)(B)(v) (2000).
40. The Paths of Civil Litigation, supra note 30, at 1829.
41. 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
42. Id. at 690. The judge noted that one concern class action auctions were meant to
combat was ex post fee-setting. Id. at 689 & n.2.
8372002]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
competitive bidding structure is implicit in the text and history of
the Act.4
3
The PSLRA granted courts great discretionary power to approve
or disapprove of lead counsel. This Note suggests that the language
of the Act, "subject to the approval of the court,"" grants discre-
tionary power to the courts in deciding not only who is retained as
counsel, but also in deciding the appropriate method of retaining
counsel. The interpretation that courts have the authority to
implement any necessary process when the lead plaintiff has failed
to choose adequate counsel is implicit in the Act. Thus, in analyzing
whether auctions are permissible in the selection of lead counsel
"[it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule."'5 Courts
have the authority and duty to interpret the PSLRA in a manner
consistent with its language and legislative purpose.
One purpose of the PSLRA was to protect members of the class
who were not actively involved in the litigation process. The statute
explicitly allows courts to correct the inadequate judgement of the
lead plaintiff if that plaintiff has not conducted a hard bargain in
choosing lead counsel.4' The court has a duty to ensure that the
plaintiff class pays no more than a reasonable fee.' 7 Rather than
having the court select counsel, undoubtably an unacceptable re-
striction on the free flow of commerce, auctions allow for the
"invisible hand"' of the market to determine which law firm will
43. Id. at 691-92.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (aX3)(BXv).
45. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (aX3)(B)(v). Without an auction system in place, lead plaintiffs are
left to their own measures in choosing the counsel that will represent the class. Factors
which could show that a firm was chosen as a result of a "hard bargain" are the absence of
conflicts of interest between the lead plaintiff and the law firm and an agreed-upon fee
schedule that is the result of a direct market determination. For more discussion on the
ability of members of the class lacking a sufficient stake in the litigation to conduct a "hard
bargain," see In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190, 1194-95 (N.D. Ill.
1996).
47. In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 483 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
48. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 62-72 (Edwin Cannan ed., The Modem
Library 1994) (1784) (coining the term and describing how the "invisible hand" of economics
plays a large role in the natural and market price of commodities).
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represent the class. Auctions represent the least intrusive means of
retaining the most effective lead counsel.
B. The Competitive Bidding Model: An Appropriate Interpretation
of the PSLRA
The PSLRA provides that the selection of lead counsel is "subject
to the approval of the court."49 Additionally, the Act confers a
significant fiduciary duty upon the lead plaintiff to act not only in
her own interest, but also in the interests of the members of the
class who are not participating in the litigation.5" If there is a
breach, or a perceived breach, of this fiduciary duty, the court has
an obligation to redress the interests of the minority of the class. In
addition to satisfying the PSLRA, the lead plaintiff must meet the
adequacy requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.51
Is it appropriate for the courts to use market mechanisms in
dealing with issues regarding traditionally private spheres? The
Supreme Court has mandated on many occasions that the reason-
able fee standard be measured on the basis of market rates, lending
support to the auction system.52 Congress has directed courts to
evaluate the quality and price of legal services provided by class
counsel. This Note will show that auctions are the least intrusive
and most effective means of promoting reasonable fees.
The Supreme Court has recognized that courts are capable of
determining the "reasonableness" of fees by comparing prevailing
market rates:
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(BXv).
50. See In re Quinxus Sec. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 967,970 (2001) (noting that "the provisions
of the PSLRA are consistent with and derived from the fiduciary obligations of the court, the
lead plaintiff and the lead counsel that are mandated by FRCP 23"); see also Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949) (discussing, more generally, the
fiduciary duty imposed upon a plaintiff in a derivative action to use his "diligence, wisdom,
and integrity" to act in the best interests of all the members of the class who have been
wronged); Martin & Metcalf, supra note 11, at 1381.
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3XB)(iii)(I)(cc); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(aX4).
52. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274,283 (1989) (holding that "attorney's fees
... are to be based on market rates for services rendered"); Blumv. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,895
(1984) (noting that "Ithe statute and legislative history establish that 'reasonable fees' under
§ 1988 are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant
community, regardless of whether plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel").
20021 839
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We recognize, of course, that determining an appropriate
"market rate" for the services of a lawyer is inherently difficult.
Market prices of commodities and most services are determined
by supply and demand. In this traditional sense there is no such
thing as a prevailing market rate for the service of lawyers in a
particular community. The type of services rendered by lawyers,
as well as their experience, skill and reputation, varies
extensively-even within a law firm. Accordingly, the hourly
rates of lawyers in private practice also vary widely. The fees
charged often are based on the product of hours devoted to the
representation multiplied by the lawyer's customary rate. But
the fee usually is discussed with the client, may be negotiated,
and it is the client who pays whether he wins or loses. [Court-
determined] fee determination[s [are] made by the court in an
entirely different setting: there is no negotiation or even
discussion with the prevailing client, as the fee-found to be
reasonable by the court-is paid by the losing party.
... [Nevertheless, a] rate determined [with reference to
industry standards] is normally deemed to be reasonable, and is
referred to-for convenience-as the prevailing market rate.'
Accordingly, courts should not be adverse to investigating the
quality and price of legal representation, and judges can and should
be allowed creativity in implementing policies and measures to
determine the appropriate price for class representation.
III. AUCTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY
A. Auctions Generally
Auctions are governed by a "nonspecified mysterious entity called
a 'competitive market' where price is determined by the forces of
competition."5' William Vickrey provides an economic rationale for
using a competitive bidding process:
53. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11.
54. Martin Shubik, On Auctions, Bidding and Contracting, in AUCTIONS, BIDDING, AND
CONTRACTING: USES AND THEORY, supra note 14, at 9.
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Economic theory tells us that perfect competition produces an
optimum allocation of resources. One of the elements of a system
of perfect competition is a system of markets in which uniform
divisible commodities are traded in by large numbers of
participants who accept the market price generated by the
forces of supply and demand as a given not subject to their
influence.... In situations where the commodity dealt in is not
uniform or is not subdivisible ... it is not always clear just what
can or should be done to generate a situation in which an
optimal result is likely to be achieved.
.... The extreme of this type of case is where the universe of
discourse contains only a single item to be transferred, and the
only optimality-affecting question to be resolved is to whom it is
to be transferred, the price being entirely a matter of
distribution and not of optimality. This case admits of a fairly
simple and frequently employed solution: the open auction,
which assures Pareto optimality.55
A Pareto optimal result occurs when there is no other feasible
alternative allocation of resources (i.e., legal services on one side
and compensation on the other) that is preferred by one party over
another allocation. 6 In a single item transfer auction, like that of
awarding the opportunity to represent the lead plaintiff in a class
action lawsuit, both the buyer and the seller have the highest
probability of achieving a Pareto optimal result.57
A court-ordered auction can be an effective tool with which to
decrease legal costs. There are, however, many concerns which
must be addressed in order to fully understand a bidding process.
Martin Shubik outlines several general factors to consider when
evaluating auctions.58 Discussion here will be limited to the four
most relevant factors to an auction system that awards the
opportunity to provide the class legal services to the most qualified
bid. These four elements include: (1) the number of potential
55. William Vickrey, Auctions, Markets, and Optimal Allocation, in BIDDING AND
AUCTIONING FOR PROCUREMENTAND ALLOCATION 13-14 (Yakov Amihud ed., 1976) (providing
an economic background for general competitive bidding models).
56. See ROBERTH.FRANi, MICROECONOMICSANDBEHAVIOR559(3ded. 1997) (explaining
the concept of Pareto optimal allocations).
57. This conclusion assumes that the normal market mechanism would likely fail or be
inefficient for the reasons discussed in the text accompanying notes 30-32.
58. Shubik, supra note 54, at 14-22.
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bidders, (2) bid preparation costs, (3) bid preparation time, in-
cluding the importance of information, and (4) estimation and
evaluation problems.5 9 Although Shubik considered these factors in
the context of generalized auctions, they also must be taken into
account in order for a lead counsel competitive bidding process to be
successful.
1. Quantity of Bidders
Opponents of a competitive bidding process in litigation often
point to the number of participants or bidders as a factor that may
decrease the effectiveness of the process compared to other
auctions.60 It is true that, if before submission, competing firms
know the number of bidders involved in the auction, or the identity
of the law firms involved in the process, there could be strategic
incentives for the submitting firms to raise or lower their bids
accordingly.6' If the number of bidders is not disclosed and collusion
prohibited, however, the bid submitted by each firm will not be
influenced by this potential infirmity of auctions.62 Accordingly, the
auction will result in a Nash equilibrium, "[tihe combination of
strategies in a game such that neither player has any incentive to
change strategies given the strategy of his opponent."63
2. Bid Preparation Costs
The amount of resources needed to enter an informed bid is
unnecessarily attacked by opponents of court-mandated auctions.
59. Id. at 14-16.
60. Jill E. Fisch,Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead
Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 53, 90 (2001) (assuming that if an
inadequate number of firms bid, the outcome will invariably be inefficient).
61. For example, if the only other firm against which a bid is placed maintains a
consistent bidding strategy that is known to rival bidders, there is the potential for inefficient
results. In this example, the informed firm will, if profitable, underbid just slightly--even
though the firm could have bid far less.
62. See Shubik, supra note 54, at 3-31. Shubik notes that the number of bids is
inconsequential when using a sealed bid auction process. However, if the auction is open to
a competitive market, there must be a high number of potential suppliers to obtain an
efficient result.
63. FRANK, supra note 56, at 442.
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Jill Fisch notes that bid preparation is an expensive proposition.6 '
In order to make and submit a rational bid, firms will always have
to examine and predict the amount of time, energy, and resources
that will be necessary to adequately represent potential clients.
Investigation of a suit prior to filing, however, is not a novel idea,
and is something every competent attorney should instinctively
undertake.6 5 Indeed, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
any representation to the court must be pursuant to "an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances.' The fact that attorneys
must do independent research before accepting a case has long been
required. It is also commonly accepted that law firms must perform
their own cost-benefit analysis of the profit potential in determining
whether to represent a client.6 7
Firms may be dissuaded from entering the bidding process for
fear that they will invest their resources and never see any results.
One solution to this problem, however, could be to share bid
preparation costs.68 If an auction system is used, courts could main-
tain a common pre-discovery file open to all legitimate potential
firms. This would reduce the cost of information while at the same
time maintaining the anonymity of the firms participating in the
bidding process. An alternative to a common pool of information
could be a bartering of information between firms. Although this
has the potential to undermine the inherent value of the auction
process, "[tihe risk-sharing aspects of bid preparation can be
modified virtually continuously by contracting."69
Additionally, the argument that firms will suffer a "deadweight
loss" if they are unsuccessful in their bids is offset by the societal
64. Fisch, supra note 60, at 90. Fisch concludes that "[a] bidding firm must investigate
the case and predict the expected recovery under various litigation scenarios, as well as the
cost associated with each possible recovery, to propose a rational bid structure." Id.
65. See generally George Cochran, Rule 11: The Road toAmendment, 2 ATr' SANCTIONS
NEWSL. 138, 139-41 (1991) (noting the importance of a detailed examination of a prospective
litigation).
66. FED. R. Cirv. P. 11(b).
67. See Peter J. Hammer,Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare,
and the Challenge ofIntramarket Second-best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849,891-95 (2000)
(describing the general cost-benefit analysis that a firm undertakes when deciding to pursue
litigation).
68. See Shubik, supra note 54, at 14-15.
69. Id. at 15.
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gain of a more efficient judicial process.70 Firms already allocate
resources to evaluate the prospects of class litigation and are
accustomed to some "dead weight." The fact that firms should be
careful in evaluating the potential gains of entering litigation is
unaffected by the use of auctions.
3. Bid Preparation Time
The arguments regarding bid preparation time parallel the
arguments about preparation costs discussed above. The time it
takes to prepare an earnest bid is an understandable concern. Law
firms will undoubtedly expend much time and energy in preparing
acceptable and competitive bids.71 Naturally, there are time
constraints placed on firms when calculating whether to submit a
bid, and if the firm decides to bid, the amount of its bid.72 An
auction, however, has time constraints nearly identical to those
imposed in free market selection of counsel. If a lead plaintiff could
conduct a hard bargain in her search for lead counsel, the time
expended by each law firm in an auction system would be nearly
identical to that of an open market process.
Even when courts do not use auctions, plaintiffs face costs:
"There are costs of searching for the right prices and quality, of
negotiating and closing the contracts. These costs can be sub-
stantial, particularly when the choice is between pure exchange
with a multiplicity of external organizations ... .73 In a typical, non-
auction system, lead plaintiffs, assuming they are rational in their
selection of counsel, will act to avoid the costs described above by
selecting a firm that they have employed in the past or conducting
70. As discussed in Part III, an auction system would reduce litigation concerning
whether a lead plaintiffs selection of counsel was sufficiently "adequate" to represent the
remainder of the class.
71. According to one author, "the first requisite for successful bidding is to carry a sharp
pencil." GENE GAROFALO, SECRETS OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING: STRATEGIES FOR FINDING AND
WINNING MILLION DOLLAR CONTRACTS 2 (1990). Thus, firms interested in competing for the
role of lead counsel must be willing to expend resources for the sole purpose of creating a bid.
72. When a law firm enters an auction, it is well aware that if its bid is unsuccessful, the
time and resources spent to evaluate the case and prepare a bid will be "sunk costs."
73. SIMON DOMBERGER, THE CONTRACTING ORGANIZATION: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO
OUTSOURCING 14 (1998) (discussing the numerous costs generally associated with




only a cursory investigation of which firm could most adequately
represent the class. This has the potential, however, to result in the
problems that the drafters of PSLRA specifically wished to address,
specifically, the lead counsel's failure to act in the class' interest.
74
Concerns about the time and money spent bidding reflect a
general fear that if auctions are promoted and used regularly, firms
may be dissuaded from participating by the fear that large
investments in the preliminary stages of pending litigation may
never materialize; however, this has not been the result. In fact,
firms have become more efficient in their research methods and are
becoming increasingly better at developing bids.7" David Boies' Wall
Street firm, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, represented the class in
the Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation,7" and had little difficulty
making and submitting a bid." In fact, Boies welcomed the
opportunity to stir up the legal world by revealing how efficient the
representation process can be-much to the chagrin of competing
law firms.7"
Additionally, the fear that small firms will be effectively
eliminated is unfounded. Smaller firms that are qualified to take on
security class action litigation are in the best position to prove their
ability to adequately represent the class in an auction system, thus
providing lead plaintiffs with an enlarged pool of potential lead
counsel.79 There is a direct positive correlation between increasing
74. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
75. See James B. Stewart, Bidding War: Christie's, Sotheby's, and the Art of Betrayal,
NEW YORKER, Oct. 15, 2001, at 158, 168 (describing the strategy of one successful bid).
76. 197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
77. See Stewart, supra note 75, at 168; see also Laural L. Hooper & Marie Leary,
Auctioning the Role of Class Counsel in Class Action Cases: A Descriptive Study 55 (2001)
(noting that Boies had the winning bid in Auction Houses and that the judge compared the
bid's terms to the "mean of ' bid of $96 million submitted by four firms who were members
of a proposed executive committee organized by the attorneys for the various plaintiffs in
order to have the committee designated as lead counsel").
78. See Sindy Goldman & Greg Sargent, It's Boies' Town: Microsoft Hotshot Hordes
Sotheby's Pie, N.Y. OBSERVER, at http://www.observer.com/pages/story.asp?ID=2933
(commenting on Boles' successful bid in the Auction House Litigation) (last visited Nov. 10,
2002).
79. See GAROFALO, supra note 71, at 1 ("Competitive bidding is a quick way for small
companies to reach [large results] .... '). Some commentators feel that small firms will be
unable to overcome the economics of scale inherent in large firms. Yet "[ilf small firms can
win auctions based on reputation for producing quality results for the class, they may be able
to compete with the biggest firms." Randall S. Thomas et al., 80N.C. L. REV. 115,196 (2001).
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the number of potential bidders and the likelihood of a Pareto
optimal result. Thus, small firms and large firms will both play an
integral role in the development of auctions pursuant to the
PSLRA.80
4. Estimation and Evaluation Problems
Competing firms could incur the risk of an inaccurate assessment
of a settlement price or prospective reward. Obviously, it is not easy
to value the potential reward of a class action lawsuit. Due to the
inherent difficulty in establishing bids, firms may underbid,
successfully obtain the role as lead counsel, and later discover that
their bid was not high enough for them to profitably follow through
with the litigation. This has aptly been called the "winner's curse."1
This "curse" could result in incentives to settle a case too early or
hold on to a case for too long in the hope of a long-shot payout.8 2
However, the "winner's curse" problem is also present in non-
auction litigation where, after retaining a law firm, the plaintiff
finds that the interests of the firm and the interests of the client
do not coincide. A "winner's curse" problem is thus, not solely an
auction phenomenon but is instead endemic to class action
litigation.8
A firm also may syndicate, or "agree by contract, or less formally, to coordinate services on
a particular project." Id. at 122-23.
80. Courts reserve the authority to dispose of obviously unqualified bids. See, e.g., In re
Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 217 (3d Cir. 2001). The court of appeals noted that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected a bid that would have resulted in
fees of only one to two percent of total recovery. The Third Circuit characterized the bid as
"quasi-philanthropic" and eliminated it because "such an apparently 'cheap' fee does not
make professional sense." Id.
81. See generally RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXESAND ANOMALIES
OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50-62 (1992) (describing the literature on this theory).
82. See RICHARDA. POSNER, ECONOMICANALYSIS OFLAW 627 (5th ed. 1998). Posner notes
that the problem resulting from underbidding is that
[tihe lawyer for the class will be tempted to offer to settle with the defendant
for a small judgment and a large legal fee, and such an offer will be attractive
to the defendant, provided the sum of the two figures is less than the
defendant's net expected loss from going to trial.
Id.
83. We must assume that participants will internalize all available information and will
understand the care necessary in developing a bid. Thus, the "winner's curse" correction,




B. The Double Auction Model and Economic Efficiency
The legal auction model can be compared to what has been
termed a "double auction," a "blind match environment without
market makers with market making obligations and without the
possibility to lock in prices for large blocks without exposing prices
to the pit."
8 4
Double auction markets are fascinating institutions. They
establish a simple set of rules that organize the interaction of a
large number of individual traders. In spite of the diversity of
choice and the complexity of interaction, the markets bring on
efficient allocations. This is most probably true in the double
auction markets in business and finance but certainly true in
experimental double auction markets.85
In his seminal work, Abdolkarim Sadrieh examines the high
market efficiency of auctions which positively correlates to "a
remarkable convergence to the market clearing price."' This is a
very interesting model to follow. It Sadrieh is correct, a high
degree of "diversity of choice" in potential lead counsel will result
in a greater degree of efficiency in the auction model.
IV. THE EXPERIMENT OF AUCTIONS IN THE COURTHOUSE
Using auctions to determine lead counsel has two important
benefits. First, it resolves the problem of the "race to the court-
house," thus providing judges with increased control over quality
and price of representation. 7 Second, auctions have the potential
84. Andrea M. Corcoran, The Argument for a Professional or Wholesale Futures
Market-Where is it Going in the United States--And Why?, in BROKER-DEALERREGULATION
179, 186 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 1997); see also Juin-jen Chang et al., Casual Police
Corruption and the Economics of Crime: Further Results, 20 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 35 (2000)
(explaining the mathematical theory behind double auction models); Karim Jamal & Shyam
Sunder, Bayesian Equilibrium in Double Auctions Populated by Biased Heuristic Traders,
31 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 273, 287 (1996). See generally ABDOIAIM SADRIEH, THE
ALTERNATING DOUBLE AUCTION MARET. A GAME THEoRETIC AND EXPERIMENTAL
INVESTIGATION 1-5 (Lecture Notes in ECON. & MATH. Sys., Series No. 466 (1998)).
85. SADRIEH, supra note 84, at 1.
86. Id.
87. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 258 (3d Cir. 2001).
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to lead to lower legal fees. 8 Reducing excessive attorneys' fees in
class action litigation is not a novel idea; in fact, much debate
surrounds the high fees that attorneys charge.89 There is an even
greater concern when nonparticipatory plaintiffs, who have no say
in their legal representation, are forced to pay a price for which
they had no ability to bargain." Thus, courts have the unique op-
portunity to deal with a contemporary problem within the current
system without having to resort to changing ethical or procedural
rules.
A competitive bidding process can be used to correct the fail-
ures in fee structures that have plagued class action litigation.9 1
Essentially, a lack of competition among attorneys92 has limited the
number of firms with the ability or influence to be retained as lead
counsel in these "mega" class action lawsuits.9" A choice among
attorneys who have the ability to represent the class is consistently
viewed to have more positive effects on consumers of legal counsel,
thus resulting in societal gains. When there are only a limited
88. Id. at 258-59; see also supra Part III (explaining the cost effectiveness of auctions).
89. See, e.g., David M. Young, Plaintiffs Attorneys' Fees in Class Action Litigation: An
Ethical Solution, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDYL. ETHICS 255,255-56 (1999). Young argues that there
are too many instances where the attorneys for plaintiffs are receiving unjustifiably high
fees. This "unhealthy byproduct" is most notable in class action litigation. Id.
90. Id. Young observes:
The current challenge to the legal system is whether it can responsibly deal
with this problem within the current structure of ethics rules and the rules of
court procedure, or whether more draconian reforms will be necessary through
amendments of the federal rules, the rules of ethics for lawyers, or through
legislative restrictions.
Id.
91. See, e.g., Kranhold & Schmitt, supra note 3. The article notes that in the recent past
"a small group of firms has come to control class action lawsuits." Id. These "firms haven't
had to compete on the basis of fees-and the fees have gone relatively unchecked by judges
who have the authority to set them." Id.
92. See Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or
a Market for Champerty?., 71 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 625, 644 (1995) (noting that "for many
litigants, lawyers' domination of the market for champerty is an unavoidable fact of life").
There are three factors that, if present, indicate that a firm maintains monopolistic power:
(1) there is only one firm producing a good or service; (2) the firm does not have rivals or
competitors; and (3) there are prohibitions on new firms entering the market. S. CHARLES
MAURICE ETAL., MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: APPLIED MICROECONOMICS FOR DECISION MAKING
496-503 (4th ed. 1992).
93. See generally Young, supra note 89, at 255-56. A monopoly is defined as "[a] market
structure in which a single seller of a product with no close substitutes serves the entire
market." FRANK, supra note 56, at 381.
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number of firms with the ability or inclination to represent an
aggrieved class, the potential for monopolistic behavior increases.
As a matter of public policy, monopolies should be avoided as a
matter of "fairness" to potential consumers and because of an
"efficiency objection ... [to] lost consumer surplus."9' The auction
Judge Walker proposed in Oracle was designed to allow for "[even]
a single buyer or seller [to] simulate the operation of the
competitive market," thereby simulating market mechanisms even
if a small number of firms bid for the role of lead counsel.
Judge Walker's idea was to simulate market competition in a
selection process prone to inefficiencies." Judge Walker maintained
that in certain situations a competitive bidding process is necessary
to guard against "the inherent conflicts and agency problems in
class actions."97 Walker proposed a "sealed bid" auction that allowed
the court to take the following factors into account in deciding
which firm would be appointed lead counsel:
(1) the firm's experience in securities class action litigation and
the background and experience of those lawyers in the firm who,
it is anticipated, will be engaged in representing the class ...; (2)
the bona fide qualifications of the firm to complete the work
necessary for representation of the class, including the
willingness of the firm to post a completion bond ... for the
faithful completion of its services to the class ...; (3) the firms
insurance coverage for malpractice; (4) evidence that the firm
has evaluated the case, including specifically the range and
probability of recovery; (5) the percentage of any recovery the
firm will charge ...; land] (6) a certification ... that ... [the firm's]
proposal was prepared independently of any other firm ....
The Walker model described above takes into account many
different factors, and bidding firms should try to conform to this
94. FRANK, supra note 56, at 411 (emphasis omitted).
95. Andrew K. Niebler, In Search of Bargained-For Fees for Class Action Plaintiffs
Lawyers: The Promise and Pitfalls of Auctioning the Position of Lead Counsel, 54 Bus. LAW.
763, 763 (1999) (discussing in re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990)).
96. See In re Oracle, 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990); see also Wenderhold v. Cylinck
Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (ordering another auction in Judge Walker's
court).
97. Wenderhold, 188 F.R.D., at 587.
98. Id. at 587-88.
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model if they are serious about submitting a bid in any court. These
guidelines are important in conforming the behavior of firms, but
law firms are still left wondering exactly what a successful bid looks
like.9
If the auction process is to be successful, firms must know and
understand what courts are looking for in the submission of bids.
Much like a contractor submitting a bid for a construction project,
to be successful in this environment lawyers must have full
information on how, when, and at what price to submit bids.'0°
Judge William H. Walls suggested that the most telling charac-
teristics of a winning bid were three-fold:
(1)[1]itigation experience, including (a) demonstrated ability to
try successfully a case, if necessary, and (b) demonstrated ability
to achieve an effective resolution by settlement; (2) fiscal ability
to maintain the litigation; and (3) a fee schedule that represents
a realistic incentive to pursue a determined resolution of the
plaintiffs cause at a reasonable cost.11
Although courts have placed an emphasis on maintaining a
reasonable price for legal services, cost is not the sole determinative
factor. That a law firm is the lowest bidder does not mean that it
will or should be selected. As Judge Walker warned in Oracle,
"selection of class counsel solely on the basis of price, without
consideration of qualitative factors and possible penalties for poor
performance, may create an incentive for 'lemon' lawyers to drive
out the good ones from the bidding process.' 0 2
99. See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Judge Lewis
Kaplan, for example, refused to give information about the nature and specifics of bids, in
fact, refusing to provide either the winning or competing bids in his opinion. Id.
100. See GAROFALO, supra note 71, at 7 (noting the importance of uncovering as much
information as you can, because "[tihe more advance knowledge you have about a bid, the
better you're able to prepare for it').
101. In re Cendant Corp. Litig, 191 F.R.D. 387, 390 (D.N.J. 1998).
102. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 639, 648 (1991); see also Fisch, supra note 60, at
84-85. Explaining the inherent difficulty in evaluating firm quality and the problems that
arise, Fisch describes the "lemons" problem as, "[tihe knowledge that [high quality firms]
cannot compete with lower quality firms on the basis of price.... [This] may cause high quality
firms to drop out of an auction they cannot win, rather than needlessly incur the costs of
participation." Id. at 84.
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Judges have different criteria and should be granted broad
discretion in evaluating the quality of a submitted bid.'0 3 Since
determination of class representation through a competitive bidding
process inevitably will be very fact-specific, judges' final decisions
must be upheld unless they can be shown to be arbitrary and
capricious. °4 A heightened standard of deference to judicial
decisions in selecting lead counsel through an auction method must
be applied in higher courts.
V. THE EFFECTS AUCTIONS HAVE ON PROSPECTIVE LEAD
PLAINTIFFS AND PROSPECTIE LEAD COUNSEL
If courts implement competitive bidding models in securities
litigation more frequently and prospective lead counsel and lead
plaintiffs can rely on its use, auctions will become even more
successful and efficient. Auctions will have a greater ability to
achieve an efficient price coupled with the most effective quality of
legal service. Lead plaintiffs will engage in a more effective, harder-
bargained negotiation with a wider variety of lead counsel.I05 If a
lead plaintiff breaches her fiduciary duty to the rest of the class by
failing to select the counsel who will best and most effectively
represent the class, courts maintain the ultimate authority to
disapprove of the lead plaintiff's selection and thus should be able
to initiate an auction to determine class representation.
When conducting a competitive bidding system, judges must
retain the flexibility afforded to them by the PSLRA to approve
counsel at all times,106 including the ability to dispose of obviously
unqualified bids. Judge Walker, for example, used his discretion to
103. For a description of these factors, see supra text accompanying notes 98, 101.
104. There have been several challenges regarding chosen lead counsel. See, e.g., Oracle,
136 F.R.D. at 642-43 (noting that the losing bidder moved the court for reconsideration based
on conflicts of interest between the chosen firm and the class it was to represent); In re
Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., No. 95-C-7679,1996 WL 197671, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22,
1996) (describing a losing bidder that complained that the winning bidder would be unable
to exercise its best efforts on behalf of the class).
105. See notes 32, 46, and accompanying text.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3XBXv) (2000).
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conduct two bidding rounds during implementation of the auction
process in Wenderhold v. Cylink.'0 7
That auctions do not guarantee a Pareto optimal result is not of
consequence."0 8 Mistakes can and do happen in auctions. In the
event that an auction fails, however, the court would retain power
and have the authority to eliminate and correct the mistakes. A
courthouse auction must restrict all forms of strategic behavior that
could have an adverse effect on the efficiency of the bidding
process.0 9 As judges are in the best position to monitor and
evaluate bids, auctions in the courthouse have the potential to
approach a Pareto optimal allocation of representation.
If an auction is initiated, law firms that consider entering the
competition will have a more proactive role in the process. Instead
of using resources to court a prospective client, they will be
investing resources in preliminary legal and factual investigations
as well as in the ultimate potential for success. Thus, it is true that
law firms will adjust their behavior to allocate more resources to
avoid the dangers of over or underbidding. Abdolkarim Sadrieh
discusses learned behavior of participants in double auction
experiments where two different types of bidders arise-moderate
and aggressive."' Sadrieh's underlying theory is that buyers will
act in ways so as to avoid "regret.""' If information is freely
available, and firms are therefore able to process this information
107. 191 F.R.D. 600 (N.D. Cal. 2000). In Wenderhold the court considered not only highest
net recovery to the class, but also qualitative advantages of a successful bidder's small size
and accounting expertise. Id. at 601-03.
108. See Andrew Schotter, Auctions and Economic Theory, in BIDDING AND AUCTIONING
FOR PROCUREMENT AND ALLOCATION, supra note 55, at 3, 4-5. Schotter notes that Pareto
optimal allocations are not always attributable to the auction itself, but instead to behavior
of the participants after the auction. An example is tobacco buyers' buying and then reselling
the rights to their purchase in later rounds of the same auction. Id. This, of course, could
happen in the legal world as well. If a successful bidder were unable to adequately handle
one aspect of the litigation, the bidder could contract or refer it to another firm that would
be better qualified to handle the situation.
109. See id at 5. Schotter describes strategic behavior such as the unrestricted ability of
buyers and sellers to "make offers, announce threats, and join coalitions." Id. An auction, if
properly monitored, can be devoid of these types of strategies.
110. SADRIEH, supra note 84, at 244-45 (explaining that an aggressive bid is one that is
higher than the highest previous bid for a similar good, whereas a moderate bid is greater
than the seller's smallest asking price for the same good in the previous auction).
111. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 81-83 (discussing the a "winner's curse").
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and to determine a reasonable estimation of the value of the class
action litigation, "regret" will be minimized.
Neither large nor small firms will be dissuaded from entering a
court-ordered auction. 12 As law firms learn more and become better
informed about bidding practices and strategies, their bids will
approach market-clearing prices.11
CONCLUSION
In passing the PSLRA in 1995, Congress intended to correct
infirmities associated with the representation of plaintiffs in class
action securities litigation. Goals such as the elimination of the
"race to the courthouse" have been effectively accomplished.
Another underlying purpose of the PSLRA, however, was to
preserve the rights of all claimants, not just those with the largest
stake in the litigation. The ability of a lead plaintiff to select and
retain counsel for the class has the potential to infect class action
litigation with a variety of conflicts. Because of the enormous stakes
in the litigation of large class action lawsuits and the ever present
duty to represent the whole class, courts and judges have the
obligation to ensure that the rights of the whole class are respected
at all times.
The innovative tool of an auction or a competitive bidding
process, described in this Note, is the most efficient way to meet the
goals of the PSLRA. The inherent conflict of allowing a lead plaintiff
to select and retain counsel who will act in her best interests and
ignore the remainder of the class is ever present in an environment
without auctions. Thus, working within the parameters and
language of the PSLRA, an auction is implicitly allowed by the
provisions of the PSLRA and is the most efficient way to ensure a
market clearing price.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80 (discussing the role small firms can play in
the auction process).
113. See SADRIEH, supra note 84, at 252 (noting that the frequency of problems such as the
"proposer's curseD" will decrease when firms become more experienced). According to
Sadrieh, "the occurrence frequency ofproposer's curses in the experienced subject groups was
generally well below the median of the distribution of that value in the zero-intelligence
trader simulations." Id. at 252.
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In the interests of maintaining reasonable fees, improving
judicial efficiency, and respecting the interests of all members of the
class, a competitive bidding system to determine lead counsel must
be used with increased frequency in class action litigation.
Charles H. Gray
